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8

WHY SOCIALISM IS NECESSARY

LEO HUBERMAN

NORTH KOREA

BEN PAGE

Illumination, Shame, and Scandal

MAXWELL GEISMAR

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EDITORS: Paul M. Sweezy and Leo Huberman (1903-1968)

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

About 500 people attended the memorial service for Leo Huberman which was held in the Community Church of New York on December 2nd. James Aronson, former editor of the *Guardian*, acted as Chairman and read a short autobiographical sketch which was found among Leo's papers, as well as a selection from the large number of messages of tribute and condolence which had been received up to that time. The rest of the program consisted of readings by four of Leo's young friends from his writings, an excerpt from a recorded speech in which Leo read Shelley's "Men of England" (one of his favorite poems), and tributes by Stephen Fischer and Paul Sweezy. The full text of the service will be published by Monthly Review Press, and we hope to be able to send it free to all subscribers.

Many people have inquired about future plans for MR. Only one thing is certain as of the end of December: the magazine will continue to be published as it has been for the last two decades. But the changes which will be necessary or desirable because of Leo Huberman's death are still

(*Continued on inside back cover*)

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WHY SOCIALISM IS NECESSARY

BY LEO HUBERMAN

This is the text of a talk by Leo Huberman at a Conference on Latin America held at the University of Nijmegen, Holland, on November 6th, two days before his death. The Conference was held under the auspices of the Nijmegen Student Union which is generally regarded as the vanguard of the Dutch radical student movement. More than 500 students gave Leo Huberman's talk an extremely enthusiastic reception.—P.M.S.

There are some nations in the world which are poverty-stricken because they lack natural resources. But that is not true of the Latin American countries. They have an abundance of the resources necessary to make a country rich. No continent in the world compares with Latin America in the amount of cultivable high-yield soil, or in reserves of timber. List the metals important to industrial development—copper, tin, iron, silver, gold, zinc, lead—all of them and many others, as well as oil and hydroelectric power potential, are found in great abundance in Latin America.

Yet the people of Latin America are desperately poor. The statistics presented to Congress by former President John F. Kennedy in his message proposing the Alliance for Progress program on March 14, 1961, tell the story:

> The average per capita annual product is only $280, less than one ninth of the United States—and in large areas, inhabited by millions of people, it is less than $70. . . .
>
> The average American can expect to live 70 years, but life expectancy in Latin America is only 46. . . . While our rate of infant mortality is less than 30 per thousand, it is less than 110 per thousand in Latin America. . . .
>
> Illiteracy extends to almost half the adults, reaching 90 percent in one country. And approximately 50 percent of school-age children have no schools to attend. . . .

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In one major Latin American capital, a third of the total population is living in filthy and unbearable slums. In another country 80 percent of the entire population is housed in make-shift shacks and barracks. . . .

Poverty, illiteracy, hopelessness and a sense of injustice—the conditions which breed political and social unrest—are almost universal in the Latin American countryside.

Mr. Kennedy not only described the need, he also advised on the steps to be taken: "A program for improved land use, education, health, and housing. . . . There is an immediate need for higher and more diversified agricultural production, better distribution of wealth and income, and wider sharing in the process of development."

The statement of the problem by Mr. Kennedy and what must be done about it were convincing, and the Congress of the United States adopted his "Alliance for Progress" aid program. Today, seven years later, it has become apparent to almost everybody, that the plan has one important defect—it won't work. Not because the appropriation isn't enough—the plan wouldn't work if the appropriation were multiplied ten times.

It won't work because it doesn't affect the imperialist relationship which is the fundamental cause of the conditions the United States says it wants to alleviate. Latin American countries are rich in natural resources, but their people are poor because their economies are lopsided; the wealth flowing from their natural resources is appropriated by U.S. monopoly corporations which have distorted these economies in their concentration on the extraction of profitable raw materials. The land which is not in the hands of foreign interests is held by the native bourgeoisie—the traditional landowning aristocracies now intertwined with the financial, commercial, and manufacturing classes. Much of the land is out of production and much of the rest is underutilized. Unless and until these two ruling groups—the foreign and domestic capitalists—are forced to give up their power, property, and privilege, unless the economic and social structure of these Latin American countries is radically altered, then nothing fundamental will be changed. The people will remain hungry.

The aid program won't do what Mr. Kennedy said it would because it does not give the Latin American countries genuine in-

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dependence, it does not break the economic stranglehold that U.S. imperialism has on the whole continent. Without genuine independence, the Latin American countries will remain, in effect, colonial appendages of the North American metropolis. And their most basic difficulties arise precisely from their past history and present status as colonial appendages.

If the Alliance for Progress won't solve the problem for the Latin American countries, what will? The answer is socialism. Latin America, as well as the other underdeveloped areas of the world, must have socialism because capitalism, which is inseparable from imperialism, is incapable of generating, in the underdeveloped countries, the kind and degree of economic development that is absolutely essential to provide rising living standards for rapidly growing populations.

Socialism, on the other hand, would make it possible for the Latin American countries to take the steps necessary for economic development. *Political independence, though of the utmost importance, is not enough; Latin American countries must win economic independence too.* And economic independence—in the sense of establishing *their own control over their own economic surplus* so they can apply it to productive capital investment for the planned economic development of the whole nation—involves those far-reaching social changes which spell revolution, and socialism.

In the *New York Times Magazine* of Sunday, December 4, 1960, Senator Mike Mansfield addressed himself to "The Basic Problem of Latin America." Here is what he proposed must be done by any Latin American nation that wished to develop:

(1) It must act, at once, to alleviate the most glaring inadequacies in diet, housing, and health from which tens of millions of people suffer.

(2) It must improve agriculture by diversifying crops, broadening land ownership, expanding cultivable acreage and introducing modern agricultural techniques on a wide scale in order to increase production, particularly of food.

(3) It must bring about the establishment of a steadily expanding range of industries.

(4) It must wipe out illiteracy within a few years and provide

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adequate facilities to educate an ever-increasing number of highly trained technicians, specialists, and professionals to provide the whole range of modern services.

(5) It must end the relative isolation of the beachheads from the interiors, and the parts of the interior from one another, by a vast enlargement of existing systems of transportation and communications.

The interesting thing about this excellent prescription for curing the ills of the Latin American countries is that it is an age-old remedy prescribed by equally competent doctors years and years ago. In different words which said the same thing, it was prescribed for Cuba by the Foreign Policy Association in 1935, by the World Bank in 1950, and by the United States Department of Commerce in 1956; but the medicine was never swallowed—until the revolutionary government of Cuba came to power. Now, at long last, the things that needed doing, the measures for making a healthy instead of a sick nation, are being taken. What Senator Mansfield and the Foreign Policy Association and the World Bank and the Department of Commerce and President Kennedy said had to be done *is* being done—in *socialist* Cuba. But it is *not* being done, to any significant extent, in any of the capitalist, colonial countries of Latin America. Nor *can* it be done in those countries unless and until they too have their own socialist revolution.

This is the lesson to be learned from the Cuban Revolution—a vitally important lesson for all Latin American countries. The experience of Cuba proves beyond a doubt that a social revolution is an indispensable precondition for the initiation of economic growth and social development.

In his famous "History Will Absolve Me" speech at his trial, following the unsuccessful attempt of the revolutionaries to capture Fort Moncada on July 26, 1953, Fidel Castro spoke of six problems that "we would take immediate steps to resolve"—the problems of land, industrialization, housing, unemployment, education, and health—the same problems President Kennedy and Senator Mansfield addressed themselves to.

The revolutionary regime took power on January 1, 1959. *Immediately* it took the promised steps to resolve those prob-

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lems. In education and in health its achievements have been especially notable. Nowhere else in the world—except possibly in the socialist countries of the Soviet Union and China—has so much been done in so short a time as in Cuba, in education and in health.

Illiteracy in Cuba, as in all underdeveloped countries everywhere, was highest in the rural areas. In 1960, Fidel explained the facts to the Cuban people and asked for 1,000 men and women, who had education beyond the level of second year high school, to volunteer to go into the most remote areas of the country to teach reading and writing, hygiene, and nutrition. Five thousand people from all walks of life answered the call—including doctors and engineers who had to be dissuaded from going because the Revolution needed them in their own professions.

These volunteer teachers received special training in camps set up in the mountains: they averaged 50 students per teacher—classes for youngsters in the day time, for adults in the evening.

That was only the beginning. The next year, 1961, was properly labelled "The Year of Education," and the entire population was mobilized to eradicate illiteracy. I was in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion in that year and I heard Fidel report to the people after the counterrevolutionaries had been defeated—one achievement of which the nation was justly proud was the fact that the anti-illiteracy program continued practically without let-up during the whole invasion period.

There had to be that kind of amazing devotion and discipline because the task which the revolutionary government had set for itself was stupendous—to rid the country of illiteracy *in one year*. Reflect on this for a moment—23.6 percent of the people, almost one in four, could not read and write. You can readily imagine how great a job it was just to cover the country, to search out where and who the illiterates were; then a veritable army had to be trained in how to teach; millions of books had to be printed for both pupils and teachers; then the teachers, ranging in age from 10 to 60, had to set up classes in schools, houses, stores, offices, and factories in the cities or go to live in the most remote isolated regions in the country to teach farmers and

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their families, many of whom had never held a book in their hands before.

The teaching force numbered 271,000. Of that number, 121,000 were "people's teachers," adult volunteers who did their regular jobs and taught an average of two hours each day. Two of my friends were people's teachers—the wife taught a class of maids who worked in her neighborhood; the husband taught factory workers in the plant he headed.

The 13-year-old son of another friend as a *brigadista* of whom there were over 100,000. When school closed a month early, in May, he was sent to a special school in Varadero for a two-weeks training course, then to a peasant's house in the mountains where he lived with the family until October, helped with the work—and taught. Girls, too, were enrolled among the *brigadistas* and taught in the rural areas, but they lived in groups, with a Junior High School teacher in charge.

In September when it became apparent that the student *brigadistas*—as well as their pupils—varied in teaching ability, a call was sent out for reinforcements. It was answered by some 15,000 workers who made up the "Patria o Muerte Brigade" which promptly left for the rural areas to help the student *brigadistas*. The work of the Brigade members at home was made up by their comrades in factories and offices.

Then, finally, some 35,000 school teachers, about three fourths of the total number, enlisted in the alphabetization program.

The slogans told the story: "If you know, teach; if you don't know, learn." "Every Cuban a teacher; every house a school."

And so it was. On December 22, 1961, the alphabetization program was officially ended—and illiteracy had plummeted from 23.6 percent when the campaign opened to only 3.9 percent when it closed. Never in the history of education anywhere in the world has there been so successful an achievement.

How great an achievement it was can be seen from the following comments on illiteracy in the rest of Latin America from the Sixth Annual Report, 1966, entitled *Socio-Economic Prog-*

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ress in Latin America, published by the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, 1967:

> According to the latest data supplied by the Latin American countries, about 33 percent of the inhabitants of the region are illiterate. . . . There are wide variations in illiteracy rates of the Latin American countries ranging from 8.6 percent in Argentina to 80 percent in Haiti. Between these extremes with a rate of illiteracy that coincides with the regional median, is Ecuador, where 32.5 percent of the population was illiterate in 1960. Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela are above the median. The other countries are below it.

The campaign against illiteracy in Cuba was just the opening gun in the battle. It was not a propaganda stunt to be dropped when the point had been scored. It was the foundation for further spectacular successes in education. Many of the workers and farmers who had learned to read and write for the first time in their lives when a *brigadista* knocked at their door, instruction books and the Cuban flag in one hand and a paraffin lamp (the symbol of the campaign) in the other, enrolled in the *seguimento,* the follow-up classes, and continued their education; today some of them are studying at the university, others are managing enterprises in city and country, and some are leaders in the government or in the Party.

Paul Sweezy and I have recently returned from another 3-week trip to Cuba and we can testify: today, seven years after the end of the literacy campaign, Cuba is still a nation at school. The statistics shout the story—Fidel reported them to the people in March: 2,209,434 Cubans were then attending classes.

The population of Cuba is estimated at 8 million. This means that 27.6 percent, or more than 1 out of every 4 people in Cuba, is now getting some form of organized instruction. How very impressive this total is can be gauged by making two comparisons. The first, before and after the Revolution: in 1957, the latest pre-revolutionary year for which reliable figures are available, the population of Cuba was 6.4 million and school enrollment was about 819,000, or roughly 12.8 percent; in 1968, while the population of Cuba has gone up 25 percent, the

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number getting some form of organized education has gone up almost 170 percent!

The second comparison is that with the other countries of Latin America. Not one of them comes near the Cuban enrollment in schools, and for all the countries as a whole, the figure is 16.8 percent compared to Cuba's 27.6 percent.

I am not suggesting for one moment that the quality of Cuban education is as impressive as the quantity. It is not. We attended classes at nearly every educational level, and it was obvious that some of the teachers are poorly trained, that much remains to be done in the field of pedagogy. But it is also obvious, from talks with the Minister of Education and his aides in various departments, that they are well aware of the shortcomings and are working hard to correct them. Given time, hopefully, quality will match quantity.

If money can buy quality, then it will certainly be attained. For the Cuban government has indicated, by its fantastically large expenditures already invested in education, that it will meet the cost, no matter how great, to educate its people. In part this determination rests on the ground that it is unjust and morally wrong for education to be denied to all the people, that the first step in creating the new man in a socialist society is to raise his cultural level; in part, the government recognizes that it cannot move from underdevelopment to development without an educated population. How can the administrators, engineers, mechanics, electricians, technicians, directors, and skilled workers so essential to economic development in both agriculture and industry be obtained, except through mass education? Particularly, when, as in the case of Cuba, many of the best-trained people with advanced special skills fled the country after the Revolution, and are still leaving.

Technical, skilled help was obtained from the other socialist countries, but it was understood that the Soviet, Czech, and German technicians were on loan—Cuba had to learn from them, quickly, and train its own people at the same time. Special efforts were made, and are continuing, and from a spot check we made in the nickel plants at Moa and Nicaro, the bulk sugar terminal in Cienfuegos, and the Institute of Animal Hus-

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bandry near Havana, progress is already apparent. In each place we made a point of asking the director of the establishment whether any graduates of the special technical schools had been added to the staff. In every case they answered yes—the numbers varied from 12 to 21 young people 18 to 24 years of age—and in every case their training and work were satisfactory.

Another important aspect of the program of education is the School Goes to the Countryside Plan in which students and teachers, from secondary school level up, move to the countryside for six weeks, to do productive work in agriculture and livestock raising. It is camp living and hard work, combined with some hours of study, sports, and recreation. We saw two groups of secondary school *becados* (scholarship students) one going and the other coming to the fairly primitive tent camp site to do their bit in the gigantic coffee-planting project in the Havana Green Belt. We talked as we ate the much-too-starchy lunch of beans, rice, potatoes, rolls, cake, and yogurt. I asked one boy what he would do on completion of his school work and his reply was fairly typical: "I am going to be a doctor, but if the Revolution needs me somewhere else, I'll do that." I call this typical because in response to a similar question put to several students at two teacher-training institutes I got a similar answer. I asked, "After you graduate, will you teach in Havana or in the country?" Always the same answer: "I expect to teach in the country districts, but I will go where the Revolution needs me."

This is a reflection of an outstanding feature of the educational program in Cuba—its concentration on bringing education to the most remote areas, places where there had been few or no schools, places where illiteracy was greatest. Most of the 250,000 *becados* who receive housing, food, clothes, transportation, books—all free—plus a small monthly stipend, are boys and girls from the country.

Becados who live in boarding schools (some of the most luxurious houses and apartments of rich refugees are now their living quarters) get three meals a day plus a snack. But day-school children also get a snack and one or two meals—all free. Textbooks, too, millions of them—five million in 1967 to be exact—

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are free to all students. The claim is made—we had no time to check the figures—that whereas only one million books of all kinds had been published in Cuba before the Revolution, eight million books were published in 1967 alone.

Free meals, free books, hundreds of new schools, thousands of new classrooms, new materials, new teacher-training schools, new opportunities for learning for hundreds of thousands of people, young and old—all this costs money, lots of it. Exact education budget figures are difficult to obtain because in some instances ministries other than Education, as well as mass organizations, make outlays for education; but two things seem fairly certain:

(1) Cuba is spending on education sums far in excess of what was spent before the Revolution—over 4 times as much.

(2) Cuba's per capita expenditure of $39, and per student expenditure of $141.21, is far in excess of that of all the Latin American countries as a whole: $39 compared to $6.13 per capita, and $141.21 compared to $35.62 per student; it is also higher than that of Uruguay whose per capita of $23.17 and per student expenditure of $126.31 are the highest in the rest of Latin America.

As with education, so with health. In spite of the serious shortage of doctors and teachers of medicine, one third of whom fled Cuba, and are *still* leaving at the rate of 4 to 6 each month, in spite of the blockade which made medicines very difficult to obtain, the progress made in the field of health nevertheless, as in education, highlights the fact that what must be done in the underdeveloped countries of Latin America can be achieved only by a genuine socialist revolution.

That is the case because socialist revolution makes possible sweeping changes which, particularly in the field of health, are so necessary to remedy the evils inherent in the capitalist system. Capitalist medicine is concerned with curing sickness, and this is done magnificently for those who live where the doctors are in abundance and have money to pay; socialist medicine is concerned with *preventing* illness for all the people no matter where they live or how low their income.

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In capitalist Cuba the one medical school specialized in those branches of medicine that would prove most profitable to graduate doctors—the subject of epidemiology was not even in the curriculum, and hygiene was treated superficially; in socialist Cuba the three medical schools do not concern themselves with what would be profitable to the doctors but rather with what will benefit all the people—so epidemiology and hygiene are basic subjects.

In capitalist Cuba, as in all the other Latin American countries today, the private practice of medicine with its emphasis on money-making was supplemented by inadequate, graft-ridden state and municipal institutions in the public health sector; in socialist Cuba a health plan for the entire country has been set up, enabling the Ministry of Public Health to analyze needs, integrate previously scattered health resources into one unit, and allocate priorities in such a way as to promote the general health.

In capitalist Cuba, as in all the other Latin American countries today, doctors and hospital beds were concentrated in the major urban centers, and it was not uncommon for thousands of unfortunate rural inhabitants to die because they could not afford to go where the medical help they needed was located; in socialist Cuba the medical help needed by the inhabitants in the countryside is brought to them and it is free. Medical students have pledged, since 1964, that upon graduation they will not go into private practice, that their first two years as doctors will be spent in the dispensaries and hospitals in the remote rural areas. Cuba, in 1958, had one rural hospital with 10 beds; today in socialist Cuba there are 47 rural hospitals with 1,300 beds, plus 50 medical and dental clinics, non-existent before.

In all of Cuba, the number of hospitals has risen from 57 before the Revolution to 170 today, plus 250 polyclinics (health centers), previously unknown; beds available in hospitals and clinics have doubled, from 21,000 to 42,000, from 3.3 per 1,000 inhabitants to 5.4. Of the 19 Latin American countries only Argentina and Uruguay surpass the present Cuban figure.

How important public health is to socialist Cuba can be gauged by the budget figures allocated to health—from 21 mil-

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lion pesos before the Revolution to 180 million in 1967, that is, almost a ninefold increase in only eight years.

A planned system of public health with the major emphasis on prevention instead of on cure, free medical care, doctors and nurses and dentists and hospitals where they are needed, even if costs skyrocket—this is the health program in socialist Cuba. And it works. The statistics prove that a revolutionary approach to the problem can bring down sickness and death rates in the short space of eight years in a way that is not possible in Latin America without socialism.

Gastroenteritis has long been prevalent in Cuba and in the other Latin American countries. It has been one of the five leading causes of death, and still is. The rate per 100,000 inhabitants in Colombia is 105.4, Guatemala 229, Venezuela 64.4, Peru 103.5. In Cuba it was brought down to 50.8 in 1962, three years after the Revolution; in another four years, in 1966, the figure was reduced to 19.6. That reduction, from 50.8 to 19.6, in just four years, saved over 2,500 lives.

Due to the great work done by Drs. Salk and Sabin, it is now possible to get rid of the dread disease of polio, yet no Latin American country has succeeded in eliminating it—except Cuba. There has been not one single case of polio in Cuba for the past three years.

Malaria is still a big killer in Central America, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela. There were 3,519 cases in Cuba in 1962; there were only 10 in 1967.

High among the causes of death in Latin America is typhoid fever. There were 1,158 cases in Cuba in 1964; in 1966 there were only 167.

"One of the most serious health problems," says the Inter-American Development Bank in its 1966 Report, "is the shortage of medical personnel, aides, and health centers in most Latin American countries, and the poor geographical distribution of available personnel and facilities." Correct. Cuba has tackled that "most serious health problem" by changing that "poor geographical distribution of available personnel and facilities."

And it has done more.

Its phenomenal successes in cutting sickness and death

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rates are made possible because the Ministry of Public Health can do what cannot be done in the capitalist countries of Latin America—mobilize the entire country in a nationwide campaign to make up for the "shortage of medical personnel." Not only the trade unions, but the Cuban Women's Federation, the neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, and all other mass organizations took part in the tremendous task of mass vaccination for children. In 1964, they helped to administer anti-polio vaccine to 2,450,000 children under 14 years of age; in 1966, to 1,407,000 children under six. Every year, hundreds of thousands of children are vaccinated against smallpox, tuberculosis, diptheria, whooping cough, tetanus, typhoid.

With what result? Perhaps the best illustration of the success of the health program in socialist Cuba is the infant mortality rate which, the Report of the Inter-American Development Bank informs us, in nine Latin American countries exceeds 80 per 1,000 live births, and in two countries is in excess of 100 per 1,000 live births. In no other Latin American country is infant mortality less than 42 per thousand live births. But in Cuba, in 1966, it was 37.7.

Cuba points a lesson to the underdeveloped countries—that without a socialist revolution, there is no possibility of going beyond the introduction of largely ineffectual reforms which may ease the pain somewhat but won't cure the disease. The Latin American countries may not have learned the lesson from distant Russia and China, but it will be driven home to them by the example of neighboring Cuba.

In every country of Latin America there is a small group that understands the necessity for revolution. They are aware of the evils of capitalism and the benefits of socialism. Their problem is not *whether* to make a socialist revolution, but *how*.

One group, consisting mostly of Soviet-dominated Communist Parties, advocates a united front of all classes within the country to bring about the overthrow of oligarchic governments by peaceful means, by the ballot box.

Another group scorns this approach. It says that the imperialist United States and its Latin American ruling-class allies

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will never allow even a militant reform government, let alone a revolutionary government, to stay in power. It points to the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala as one illustration—and there are any number of other instances where the army has been called upon to overthrow any government that even threatens to impinge on imperialist power, property, and privilege.

This second group says there is only one way—armed struggle, the Cuban way, Fidel Castro's way. This point of view was widely acclaimed with the appearance last year of Régis Debray's book *Revolution in the Revolution?* which stressed guerrilla warfare as the means to success.

Debray's theory was criticized by some revolutionaries who accepted the thesis that armed struggle was the only route, but disagreed with his emphasis on the guerrilla movement and his rejection of the role of a communist party as organizer of the masses. Some, who saw in Debray's thesis the answer to the problem, were later shaken by the defeat of Che Guevara's guerrilla group in Bolivia, and his subsequent murder.

Other revolutionaries argue that while armed struggle is the means, it must be the correct kind—not the guerrilla movement of Debray, but a movement of the whole people like that in Vietnam.

Still others argue that one cannot follow any specific dogma, that the history and conditions of each Latin American country are different and the revolutionaries had better suit their theory to their own particular country.

While the debate goes on, one thing seems certain—that the objective conditions for revolution are ripe—and have been for a long time—in Latin America.

But while revolutionaries there learned a lesson from Cuba, so, too, did the United States. It has a great deal to lose from another successful revolution in Latin America, and it has made preparations to see that it won't happen.

The United States is the strongest, most mighty nation in the world. But as Victor Hugo once said, "There is nothing so powerful as an idea whose time has come." Vietnam is proving that today. Latin America may prove it tomorrow.

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NORTH KOREA: SITTING ON ITS OWN CHAIR

BY BEN PAGE

The author of the following article was a student at Charles University in Prague during the years 1964-1967. There he became a friend of members of the North Korean Embassy staff and this led to an invitation to visit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). He spent five weeks in and around Pyongyang in the summer of 1968, perhaps the first United States citizen to visit North Korea since the Korean War. He is now a graduate student in social philosophy at Florida State University.—Ed.

With the international socialist camp currently racked by internal differences, it is tempting to try to identify its members variously as of the Soviet, liberal, or Chinese types. At first glance, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) would seem to fit into the last category. But to place her there would be superficial, for much that is being developed in both the theory and practice of Korean socialism is unique. Moreover, most of those points in which she resembles China turn out to be points which the DPRK began putting into practice a good decade before the initiation of China's Cultural Revolution.

There was a particularly important Plenum of the Korean Workers' Party in April 1955, at which the Chairman and Premier, Kim Il Sung, delivered several significant addresses. One of the most important of these was his call to replace "bureaucracy" in Party and ideological work with the mass line.

According to Kim, bureaucracy, the primary shortcoming in the work-style of the Party's functionaries, was an anti-popular method of work based on administration by "directive or police methods, threatening, and intimidation." This criticism was especially aimed at the leaders of the various Party organs whose methods made Party members afraid of them. Thus members would tell lies and attempt to gloss over shortcomings, so that in

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the end, "Party organs were unable to grasp the actual conditions at the lower levels."

Another manifestation of bureaucracy listed by Kim was the tendency to follow blindly whatever instructions superiors might issue, failing to consider the specific conditions of one's own work and whether or not such instructions conformed to Party policies and decisions. Persons who act in this way, "who do not stand on their own feet as revolutionaries, are prisoners of the servile spirit and have lost their sense of responsibility for the work of the Party and the state." The Chairman also criticized those with a tendency to show off, claiming credit for work done by others or lording it over others by virtue of their position, and those who, anxious for favor or greedy for advancement, become sycophants toward their superiors.

> All such people have forgotten that the duty of our peoples' state and Party organs is to serve the interests of the revolutionary masses, to serve the people. . . . They regard their work in these organs not as serving the people but as holding a post in a government office. This gives rise to various wrong tendencies: army officers act like old-time high-ranking officers, policemen act like old-time policemen, and state functionaries assume the airs of old-time officials, while Party functionaries behave arrogantly on the basis of the Party's prestige. Persons of this sort . . . have failed to become servants of the people; they have degraded themselves to the level of bureaucrats.

Mao Tse-tung is, rightly, given credit for being the first major Communist theorist to recognize the material force of ways of thinking, of attitudes, ideas, and methods rooted in pre-socialist, pre-revolutionary conditions, that survive into and negatively affect the post-revolutionary situation. And the Cultural Revolution is proclaimed as the first serious attempt to deal, among other things, with the contradictions between these survivals and the needs of socialism. In this light, it is interesting to note Kim Il Sung's analysis of the source of the bureaucratic mentality, made over eighteen years ago.

> As you know, the public, or state sector holds unchallenged sway in our national economy, and the worker-peasant alliance, led by the working class, is the decisive social force in all domains of the life of our state. Under such conditions, the material source of

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bureaucracy has been basically eliminated. Bureaucracy now springs from the influence of capitalist elements which still persist in the economic system of our country, and from the survivals of the old ideas left over [from our feudal times and] by Japanese imperialist rule, while its ideological source lies in selfishness and the servile spirit typical of hirelings. There are many persons who, not yet free from the survivals of these feudal and bourgeois ideologies, do not understand that the revolution is the struggle of the masses, a struggle aimed solely at the emancipation and happiness of the masses of the people, and that the Party can carry on the revolution only by relying on the masses of the people.

One reason for this situation, according to Kim, was the fact that many of the younger Party members, those who joined after the establishment of the DPRK, lacked revolutionary experience. Among such members, despite personal loyalty to the revolution, there was a tendency toward carelessness in work habits, and a lack of knowledge of the key role of the masses, the ordinary people, in the struggle against Japan and the UN armies and in the building of the country, after liberation. They thus lacked "political maturity," which in turn nurtured in them bureaucratic attitudes and methods.

But another, more serious reason for the persistence of the problem of bureaucracy was that the Party had not been sufficiently attentive to it. The Party had neither adequately trained its newer members nor sought out and corrected instances of bureaucracy or bureaucratic attitudes among all of its members, new and old. Personnel had thus been left to continue in their accustomed ways which may, in fact, have been learned from experience at the hands of the Japanese colonial administration.

The third main reason Kim cited was the fact that "not a few of our Party functionaries confine themselves to engaging in administrative campaigns . . . and taking on functions that properly belong to administrative organs. This is because they do not understand that the aim of Party work is to help the functionaries of the given organizations grasp the political aim of their work. . . ."

To overcome these shortcomings Kim emphasized the need first to understand and combat their source in the residue of the mentality left over from feudal and Japanese occupation days.

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Concrete measures against bureaucratic practices were also encouraged. Among these, Kim particularly mentioned the need to improve the methods of the Party's leadership.

For example, he cited the need for the Party to "combine general with specific" guidance. Party functionaries were told that their job was not merely to elucidate general Party policies and principles, but to complement this by the careful study of the actual conditions relevant to the fulfillment of those aspects of Party policy for which they were responsible. Such study was to include consideration of the needs and level of political consciousness of the people involved. Only such an approach to the question of leadership would be helpful in adapting general policies to specific conditions, and in bringing the Party's policies closer to the actual needs and conditions of the people.

The method to be used in working with the people was that of explanation and persuasion, not general directives or compulsion. Only thus, Kim maintained, would the people feel encouraged to participate actively in the work of the revolution and the building of socialism, to feel that such work was their own.

However, Kim did not forget that the main problem to which he had addressed himself was that of shortcomings in the work of Party functionaries that had deeper than methodological roots. Because the problem of bureaucratic attitudes resulted from faulty ideological development, the Chairman also insisted that Party functionaries intensify their own class education, a process now known as "working-classization."*

Kim's final proposal was that the arbitrary decisions that usually result when one man is in effective authority, especially if he is not sufficiently politically conscious, be corrected by the principle of collective decision-making. Within the framework of this principle, however, constant self-criticism, "working-classization," and education in the mass-oriented revolutionary view-

* All citations thus far have been taken from the speech "On Eliminating Bureaucracy," delivered by Premier Kim Il Sung to a Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, on April 1, 1955. Kim Il Sung, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965.

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point were urged as necessary to prevent even collectives from falling victim to bureaucracy.

At the time, this analysis and prescription were concerned primarily with the work of the Party itself. Since then they have been directed toward agricultural and industrial management as well. The countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, have been turning increasingly to such measures as the granting of large degrees of independence to enterprises, the reduction of plans to the role of general macro-economic indices, giving priority to purely economic criteria and considerations, and an emphasis on enterprise profits and personal material incentives. Korean planners, on the other hand, have been taking quite a different tack in questions of economic management. A brief consideration of the Chongsan-ri method and the Daean Work System will illustrate the point.

The visit of Kim Il Sung to the collective farm of Chongsan-ri in February 1960, was not his first. He had already made 15 visits since 1945, so that he knew the farm well. Moreover he had also visited and revisited several other collective farms, watching them grow from villages of impoverished peasants who had just received land taken from the Japanese in 1945, through the ravages of the Korean War which, by taking most of the men to the front, had imposed collectivization on the women, children, and old folks who remained behind, to moderately well-off collectives capable of producing many of Korea's food needs by 1960. On his 1960 visit to Chongsan-ri, Kim spent two weeks in the farm's villages, talking and living with the workers. What most accounts emphasize is the example he set, an example of higher Party functionaries' dealing with the problems that arise in the process of socialist construction—in this case agriculture—where they are most tangible: at the point of production. The essentials of the method of management that the Premier was trying to initiate in this visit included two significant points.

First was the principle that higher organs, rather than merely issuing directives and quotas to lower organs, should seek to help them. This could only be done concretely if representatives of the former actually "went down" to the places where the people work and live, so as to "acquire a good grasp of the

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actual conditions," indicating the material circumstances, level of political consciousness, and needs and ideas of the workers.

The second point is particularly interesting in view of the current trend toward economic or technical "expertise" in Eastern Europe, a question that has also become crucial in China, but only some five years after the Koreans began grappling with it. In all work of economic, industrial, and agricultural management, priority was to be given to political considerations and to Party leadership. The people were to be helped to understand the significance of their efforts, problems, and accomplishments in the light of the national struggle to build socialism and eventually to carry it to the people of the South. Thus, instead of being mere workers, they become co-creators of the future of their country and of their own well-being within it.

In the course of implementing the principle of mass-line, anti-bureaucratic Party leadership, then, the enthusiasm and initiative of the people were to be encouraged and their ideas and suggestions actively sought. The purpose was to help the peasants and workers break down the old fatalism and passivity, typical of those who were overworked and exploited by landlords or colonial factory-owners. The consequence, as is the case in any serious attempt at "community participation," was of course double-edged. This the Koreans recognized and encouraged. As Kim put it, "This method is not only a powerful revolutionary method of education; it enhances the ideological and political levels and practical abilities of the functionaries and revolutionizes the masses."

But Korea's contribution to the question of agriculture under socialism did not stop at the level of administrative method. On the basis of twelve subsequent visits to Chongsan-ri, and to other collective farms as well, Kim enunciated his 1964 "Thesis on Agriculture." This speech set the line of electrification, irrigation, mechanization, and chemicalization in agriculture. More uniquely, however, it called for the abolition of the agricultural tax-in-kind, the last remaining agricultural tax. Moreover, it established the principle that the state was responsible for the construction of housing and that it was to repay those collectives that had already built housing at their own expense. The state

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and industry were called on to contribute materially to the development of agriculture and the elimination of differences in the living standards of town and country. Concretely, the surplus product is now distributed in Korea not, as is increasingly the case in Eastern Europe, as a function of capital investment, even in combination with labor. Rather the state, as owner of all industrial productive means, distributes the "profits" on the basis of social need, to pay for medicine, education, housing, agricultural development, etc., as well as for new investments. That this course has been possible at all is due to the fact that prior to the enunciation of "Thesis," agriculture and all other sectors were sacrificed to the needs of building a solid foundation in heavy industry whose expanded reproduction now supplies the state with the funds it needs for investment in other branches.

The results in only three or four years have been impressive. Over 90 percent of Korea's villages now have electricity. Irrigation has brought all but the most mountainous land under cultivation, even paddy cultivation. And the tractors and other farm equipment which the state supplies to most collectives as a "pump-primer" have been so profitable that Korea's tractor factory is hard pressed to keep up with new orders. It is possible to guess by sight that some collectives and villages are better off than others, but in the country, as in the city, there is no evidence of poverty. Although not all the rural housing yet has the white-washed walls and glass windows of the newer homes, only very rarely are the mud-brick, thatch-roofed houses—typical of Korea under the Japanese—seen today. Some of the more prosperous collectives report a division of income that results in an allotment of an incredible 300 *won* per household per month—twice the salary of the manager of a textile mill.

The basic problem that led to the establishment of a new system of management in industry was much the same as that which led Liberman and Sik to their reform projects, of quite another sort, in the USSR and Czechoslovakia, respectively. The question for the Koreans was: "how to raise the rate of utilization of the existing equipment and production space and to increase labor productivity in successfully realizing the Seven Year Plan [1961-1967], the basic goal of which is the all-round technical

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reconstruction and rapid development of industry." Improving the direction and management of the economy was seen as the answer; the Daean Work System, officially "born" during a December 1961 visit of the Premier to the Daean Electrical Machine Factory, as the means.

The main features of the Daean Work System, which is a refinement and development of the Chongsan-ri method, at the same time adapting it to industry, include the following: the replacement of the former system of one-man management by collective managements of enterprises through Factory Committees; a system of unified and detailed planning and guidance of production; and improved systems of supplying raw and semi-finished materials to factories and finished goods to customers.

In the old system, the director of an enterprise and the chief engineer divided the responsibilities for production and technology, a situation which was seen as reinforcing the development of bureaucracy and as providing far too large a field for subjectivity and error. In the Daean system, the director and chief engineer retain their positions, but within the context of an enterprise-wide Party Committee. Composed of representatives of all branches of the enterprise's work, including usually some 60 percent production-worker membership, this Committee determines how production is to be organized and the enterprise run. Directors and engineers become members of the Committee and executors of its decisions.

To be effective, such Committees must obviously be relatively small, the actual size depending on the size of the enterprise. The Committee, however, is but the highest organ of a hierarchical structure that ramifies throughout each enterprise and eventually, through the Party cell of the work teams, reaches each worker. The idea is that problems are to be fully discussed at all levels, recommendations being passed up from the work teams and Committee decisions going back down through the channels, with explanation of the decision in the light of current national needs and circumstances, and of Party policy. Part of the objective is to encourage the participation and ingenuity of the workers in the life of the enterprise. It is also hoped that workers will understand the decisions of the Committee and

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"adopt them as their own." Since all who participate in the work of the Committee as well as those who guide discussions at lower levels are Party members, broader interests than those immediately relevant to the particular enterprise are kept in the forefront.

Effective Party leadership of course presupposes that Party functionaries and members continually struggle to replace their own bureaucratic attitudes and methods with a revolutionary, working-class outlook. According to the Korean argument, one's level of political consciousness plays a decisive role in production. Neither production nor the development of technology can be advanced unless the ability and enthusiasm of those whose role in production is decisive are high. A true people's economy cannot be built on the basis of economic, technological, or business orientations alone: the Daean Work System is intended to combine the necessary additional elements of political leadership and mass participation which, through demonstrating to the workers that they are masters of their country and their future, will make the advance to socialism and communism possible.

It is thus clear that contrary to trends in Eastern Europe, the new system of management in Korea in no way permits enterprises to become quasi-independent nor does it relegate state plans to the role of setting up broad, long-range indices. As has been pointed out as recently as this year, a second advantage of the Daean system is that it makes it possible to apply a unified, detailed approach to planning. This approach to the problems of the increasing complexity of production, and of improving labor productivity, resource utilization, and quality of output, differs radically from Eastern European responses to similar challenges.

According to the Korean analysis, it is the Party and the state that are responsible for the economic life of the country, the people's well-being, and—particularly in present circumstances—national defense. Hence they must exercise unified control over the economy as a whole if they are to fulfill their responsibilities. Planning in terms of "large figures and general indices" is conceded to be "not so difficult," but is criticized as

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being incapable of giving the Party and state the kind of control that is needed. Moreover, such planning is also seen as incapable of making it possible to ensure a correct balance in the economy as a whole or to mobilize fully all the inner productive reserves. Thus, while Eastern Europeans are tending to reduce the scope of planning as production becomes more complex, the Koreans call for its constant refinement and sophistication. Any other approach, they say, abandons or fails to take advantage of the superiority of the socialist system.

A clearly implied, if unstated, secondary criticism is that the economic indices and values that are becoming increasingly dominant in Eastern European thinking, while they may permit greater profitability for individual enterprises, neglect the fact that socialism also has a political function and a social role: it is concerned not with the well-being of individuals or particular enterprises, but with that of the people and the economy as a whole. Overall balanced growth—embracing such non-productive services as education, health, welfare, vacation and retirement benefits, cultural establishments, and the like—is the objective. This requires detailed planning of even the relations between and within geographical regions, among various branches of production, between production and service branches of the economy, etc., in addition to planning within each enterprise and of the relationship of each to the overall plan. For all of this, reliance on economic indicators and on generalized, macroeconomic planning is seen as inadequate.

The way the Koreans describe the elaboration of plans embodies the Chongsan-ri and Daean anti-bureaucratic, mass-participation approach on a national scale. Effective planning must include variables relevant to every aspect of production, which no central or even regional planning bodies could be expected to know. The old system of planning, which made such demands, was thus criticized as a breeding ground for "subjectivism," "parochialism," and many of the other problems for which Eastern European reformers also criticized the former economic systems in their countries. However, while the latter have been giving increasing autonomy to the individual enterprises and managers, the Korean approach is to base every stage in the

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formulation, discussion, and implementation of plans on the participation of the workers.

As in the case of the management of individual enterprises, such discussion is led by Party members, so that in the course of working out and implementing plans workers are given political education in the present requirements for building socialism. This approach being duplicated on all levels, subjectivism, parochialism, and selfishness can be effectively combatted at the same time that the ideas, innovations, initiative, and needs of those on the lower levels of planning and production can be actively considered. Thus the enthusiasm of all concerned for carrying out a plan which they have helped to develop is enhanced. Only by relying on the people, the Koreans maintain, is it possible to rectify the shortcomings of the old planning system, overcome the "conservatism of experts and professionals," and develop a truly dynamic economy.

As the Koreans describe it, then, their approach to the problems of management and planning in a complex, industrialized, socialist economy is one of unified and detailed central planning, on the basis of mass participation and democratic centralism, with constant political education and Party leadership.

I found little discussion of the question of incentives. On the basis of visits to various factories, however, it seems clear that while economic incentives may be used, the primary incentives are in terms of morale. The greatest of these would appear to be a visit from the Premier. His visits to Chongsan-ri and the Daean plant have been duplicated all over the country. Initially these visits were seen as embodying the Chongsan-ri spirit of superiors becoming thoroughly acquainted with the actual conditions of the workers and in this way helping to initiate the new approach to management. Subsequently they have become a kind of follow-up and acknowledgement for work well done. In other words, Kim often revisits places where he has already been, on each visit making some kind of suggestion—known as "on-the-spot guidance"—that demonstrates his on-going interest in the particular enterprise and its workers.

In addition, there is what is known as the Chollima Rider

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movement. Named for a legendary winged horse that could travel 333 miles in a day, the movement is designed to encourage workers, brigades, and enterprises to contribute to technological, administrative, or other types of innovation so as to enhance productivity and ultimately the good of society. Where workers have earned the title of Chollima Rider, the machines are decorated, as are the shop areas where a winning brigade works. The presence of a few such decorations naturally encourages others in a given brigade or enterprise to work for the title too. When an enterprise or collective farm wins the title as a whole, it is often Premier Kim who personally presents the award, while news of each new Chollima advance (i.e. award of the title) and the reasons for the award are widely publicized in various papers and journals. This movement, in short, is evidence that the talk of encouraging worker and farmer participation in the management and technical development of their work-places is meant seriously. A secondary, but equally desired effect of reward for initiative and innovation is the breaking down of undue reverence for superiors purely because they are superiors, and for "expertise," "science," "technology" in the abstract.

While the effect of all of this may eventually wear thin, for the moment one can feel an intense groundswell of pride among the Korean people in what they have accomplished in the fifteen years since the end of the Korean War. Although by 1960 the DPRK had received about half the amount of aid South Korea had received, this was apparently used with great foresight so that the economy of the country is today largely independent. The DPRK no longer gets foreign aid, nor is there any foreign investment in her economy. Although there are products and commodities which must be imported, these are paid for by exports. The range of products actually manufactured by the DPRK is impressive, including such items as processed steel, electric locomotives and other railroad equipment, machine tools, trucks, buses, tractors and other farm equipment, construction supplies, clothing, canned foods, and even several kinds of medicines and basic medical equipment. Armaments, given the continued division of the country and the massive foreign military presence in the South, are also part of the DPRK's production program. In

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contrast with the South, however, there have been no foreign troops in the North since the Chinese withdrew in 1958.

Korea has, then, built a material basis that makes the Party line of independence and self-reliance (*juche*), self-sustenance, and self-defense realistic. The first of these, *juche,* merits further discussion, for it has been the guiding principle of the Korean Revolution from the outset. The anti-bureaucratic movement, the Chongsan-ri method, the Daean Work System, as well as the struggle to have all foreign troops removed so that the country can be unified and the revolution carried to the South are but manifestations or embodiments of the spirit of *juche*. "*Juche* is the Korean Revolution."

The concept of *juche*—or at least its practical application—seems to have been born of necessity in the late 1930's at the time of the anti-imperialist movement directed against the Japanese. A Communist Party had been founded in 1925 but had collapsed within three years, due to "factionalism, sectarianism, and flunkeyism"—charges apparently directed against those who sought to impose a line based on Soviet experience. By the mid-30's Korea's resistance to the Japanese had reached the stage of armed struggle. At that time there were no countries outside the Americas that had successfully won an armed struggle against colonialist or imperialist oppression. There was thus no relevant example the Koreans could draw on; they had to rely on their own efforts and ingenuity in everything from determining strategy and tactics to making—or capturing—military supplies, at least until the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in 1945. It was in these circumstances that the Korean communist movement was reborn, imbued by circumstances with the spirit of self-reliance and independence, i.e. with the spirit of *juche*.

With the defeat of the Japanese, the Soviet Army liberated the area of Korea north of the 38th parallel, bringing with it Kim Il Sung and the Manchurian-based resistance movement he had led for a decade. Although by agreement Soviet troops occupied the North, as American troops did the South, there was a marked difference in the attitude of the two powers. On September 7, 1945, MacArthur issued Proclamation No. 1:

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All powers of government over the territory of Korea south of the 38th degree north latitude and the people thereof will be for the present exercised under my authority. Acts of resistance to the occupying forces or any acts which may disturb public order and peace will be severely punished. . . . For all purposes during the military control, English will be the official language. . . .

In contrast, the Soviet occupation commander, Christiakov, had declared a month earlier:

Korean people! . . . Korea has become a country of freedom. However, this is only the first step in a new era of Korean history. An abundant, fruitful orchard is the result of man's effort and vigor. Therefore the happiness of the Korean people will only be achieved by the heroic efforts that you, the Korean people, will exert. Korean people! Remember that you have your future happiness in your own hands. . . .

In the North, the Koreans were encouraged and permitted to set up a provisional government—composed largely of resistance leaders—which in turn nationalized former Japanese or collaborator holdings, passed agrarian reform laws, labor laws, and laws stipulating the equality of the sexes. Moreover, it began building—or rebuilding—the area and its economy in ways that soon directly benefitted the people with such previously unknown guaranteed rights as those to work within legally set time and pay limits, to public health and medical treatment, to at least a minimum of education, to paid vacations, and the like. Although the Soviet Army remained until late 1948 (i.e., after separate governments had been established in North and South), the North Koreans were able to create a political and economic base from which they could carry on independently, along the lines of *juche*.

The conditions created by the U.S. presence in the South were rather different. The U.S. occupation's "laws on the disposal of enemy propery" made it possible for U.S. economic interests, and those of certain selected Koreans, literally to replace the Japanese as masters of the economy of the South and of the livelihood of its people. Since then, the South has become increasingly dependent on U.S. "aid" and the further penetration of U.S. and, recently once again, Japanese economic interests, while the North has become economically independent.

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Shortly after the Korean War, a dispute developed within the Worker's Party apparently over the problem of the reconstruction and future development of the North. There were those who maintained that, being a small country, Korea would do better to concentrate on light industry, agriculture, consumer goods, and housing, developing these as rapidly as possible so as to better serve the immediate needs of the people. Countries like the Soviet Union or China would always be available to supply long-term, low-interest credit for the purchase of needed products of heavy industry. The line that eventually won out was one that harked back to the principle of *juche*. Its victory may have been aided by the still fresh memory—and apparently pique—that the Soviet Union had supplied some military hardware and air cover, but no effective counter to the United States/United Nations troops during the war and no retaliatory bombing of U.S. bases in the South. Older communists also remembered that the Soviet Union, in pursuit of its own interests, had once made an agreement with a fascist government, and asked what was to prevent its doing so with an imperialist one. Then too, there was the fact that although Chinese participation in the war had done much to save the Republic, China had entered the war, as she had earlier said she would, in self-defense and only after MacArthur had crossed the 38th parallel. Far better, Kim Il Sung maintained, to develop an independent economy, fully capable of self-defense and of providing for the needs of South Korea after unification, as well as of caring for the present population of the DPRK.

What *juche* involves is the principle of solving the problems of the Korean Revolution and socialist construction independently and primarily by one's own efforts, by creatively applying the truths of Marxism-Leninism and the experiences of the international revolutionary movement to the concrete conditions of one's own country. It is on the basis of this guiding principle that Korea has accomplished what she has today; it is also on this basis that she is seeking the re-unification of the country, and the expulsion of all foreign troops from Korean territory. For, while originally intended as a weapon against those who advocated North Korean "flunkeyism" toward the Soviet Union or

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China, *juche* is also applicable to the South's present enforced flunkeyism toward the United States. The degree to which Korean culture, customs, and even Koreans themselves, are becoming corrupted by American "civilization" is criticized no less harshly now than was the presence of pictures of the Soviet Union in Korean Army barracks and schools in 1955. So long as this continues, any Koreans who understand the concept of *juche* cannot but feel a deep shame and desire to liberate the fatherland.

Not all of what is being tried or has been successful in the DPRK is applicable elsewhere. Nonetheless, there is much in Korean experience that may offer constructive suggestions to many of the countries in Africa, Asia, or Latin America seeking both economic development *and* independence. It is with this in mind that this paper has attempted to present the North Korean struggle against bureaucracy, the Chongsan-ri method and the Daean Work System which spring from it, and the concept of *juche,* which have underlain most of the DPRK's impressive, and independently acquired, successes.

To be sure, after the Korean War the DPRK did receive aid from other socialist countries. Much of this, however, was of necessity devoted to reconstruction. What is important is that the rest was invested, with great foresight, in those heavy industries that could take advantage of locally available raw materials and energy resources. As a result the DPRK today has no foreign debt, nor does she receive any foreign aid or credits. The same, of course, is also true of the USSR and China. Despite the examples the socialist construction of these countries may offer, however, the facts of their gigantic size and natural wealth often make smaller countries doubtful that they could do likewise. Here is where the example of the DPRK may have much to offer.

Cuba and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, of course, also offer examples to the smaller developing countries. But they do so mainly in the context of anti-imperialist struggle rather than in the field of economic and social development and construction. It is worth noting, however, that these three maverick socialist states seem to be developing a kind of triangle of inter-

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relationships. This is not to say that there are alliances among them or that they follow a similar road to socialism. Rather, the struggle of each to define itself independently of Peking or Moscow has given rise to a recognition of common interests, realized in growing trade relations, cultural and technical exchanges, and the like.

In the December 1955 speech in which he called for the establishment of *juche* in the work of the Party, Kim criticized those who would have Korea follow the Soviet or the Chinese way to socialism, asking if it were not "high time" for Koreans to work out their own way. The degree to which they have been successful both in *juche* and in carving out an independent position within the international socialist camp is suggested by Kim's speech, eleven years later, on "The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party":

> There are certain persons at present who attach the labels of "centrism," "eclecticism," "opportunism," and the like to our Party and to other Marxist-Leninist parties. They say we are taking the road of "unprincipled compromise" and "straddling two chairs." This is nonsense! We have our own chair. Why should we throw it away and sit uncomfortably straddling two chairs belonging to others. We shall sit on our steady Marxist-Leninist chair. . . .
>
> Regarding others with suspicion is a specific feature of great-power chauvinism and factionalism. All great-power chauvinists and factionalists suspect others for no reason and like to separate people into sides. We will not take any side. If anyone asks us which side we are on, we will answer that we are on the side of Marxism-Leninism, on the side of the revolution.

It will take a fairly long period of time to decide the issue in the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country. The reason is that the influence of the bourgeoisie and of the intellectuals who come from the old society will remain in our country for a long time to come, and so will their class ideology. If this is not sufficiently understood, or is not understood at all, the gravest mistakes will be made and the necessity of waging the struggle in the ideological field will be ignored.

—*Mao Tse-tung*, 1957

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THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA

BY JAMES PETRAS

James Petras, who teaches political science at Penn State, has written extensively on Latin America. His latest visit to the region, centering on Chile and Peru, was during the summer of 1968. The following summary of his impressions was written and accepted for publication before the overthrow of the Belaúnde government in Peru by a military *coup*. That and other developments of recent months, however, only serve to confirm the general accuracy and relevance of his analysis.—Ed.

Several years have passed since Chile and Peru elected Presidents whom liberal commentators hailed as peaceful democratic revolutionaries—to distinguish them from the violent *fidelista* type. Since then violent revolutionaries have suffered a series of political reverses that have apparently confirmed the outlook of those who opt for "democratic revolution." The democratic revolution, however, has not in fact appeared except in the writings of the polemicists and publicists. The democratic revolution has neither occurred, nor is it about to occur.

In Chile and Peru one of the key reform issues was and is agrarian reform. Both Frei and Belaúnde have failed to carry out any significant redistribution of land. In Chile less than 10,000 families out of 350,000 have received land; not even half the election pledge of 100,000 proprietors in six years will be achieved. The story is even more dismal in Peru: less than 3 percent of the peasantry in need has even the faintest hope of receiving title to land. Those elected governments which appeared most promising to the liberal reformers in the early and middle sixties have lost a great deal of their early popular support. Increasingly, in both countries, aggressive right-wing political forces are making a comeback. Basing themselves on an attack on the obvious failures of the liberal reform governments, capitalizing on the electorates' disgust with empty revolutionary phrasemongering in both Chile and Peru, the Right is on the march. In Chile the National Party, referred to two years ago

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in the popular press as *momias* (mummies) has launched an aggressive campaign against the Frei government, combining an appeal for order and stability (based on the government's inability to control inflation) with promises to provide jobs, security, and government-promoted welfare and housing programs. In Peru the highly disciplined and rigidly organized American Revolutionary Popular Alliance (APRA) has launched a Nixon-style campaign attacking the government for being too conservative or too reformist, depending on whom they are addressing. In practice APRA has been allied with the party of former right-wing military dictator Odría and has seriously weakened the early attempts at reform by the government's former coalition partner, the Christian Democrats. The failure of the Christian Democrats and latter-day populists in Chile and Peru and the resurgence of right-wing political groups in both countries combine to form one aspect of the new developments in Latin America.

On the Left, the pro-Moscow Communists have in large part been identified so closely with these same bankrupt governments that they have little appeal for the discontented mass of the electorate. This is especially the case in Chile. In Peru, because of the more repressive political ambience, the Communists, together with a number of disgruntled former supporters of the government parties, may gain a few more parliamentry seats. The revolutionary Left, still recuperating from its recent defeats, is in the process of reconstructing its organizations, under conditions which, in many Latin countries, are now more propitious for the radical Left than they were even two or three years ago.

Electorates, having experienced the failures of the liberal governments, harbor ever fewer illusions about the possibility of peaceful agrarian reform. More and more people, while perhaps not ready for insurrection, are becoming open to radical politics. The revolutionary Left's earlier bid for power was premature in the sense that it overestimated the tempo of the radicalization process, predicating immediate action on a *correct* forecast that the liberal reformers would not carry out the basic changes they had promised. Nevertheless, the leaders who have

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survived the counterrevolutionary repression are aware of the new situations opening up and are undogmatically re-analyzing their past experiences.

The slow re-emergence of revolutionary groups is probably the least evident of the new developments in Latin America. The new revolutionary Left is not a homogeneous and coherent organizational-ideological grouping. Primarily based in the cities, it is largely made up of intellectuals and students and has strength among newly organized workers, especially of the white-collar variety (health workers and teachers in Chile, fishermen in Peru, bank employees in Uruguay, etc.). The development of urban radicalism among white-collar and newly organized blue-collar workers, massive struggles in provincial universities of Argentina and among the Catholic students and trade unionists in Brazil's most modern and highly developed cities—provide the base for the growth of the new revolutionary Left in Latin America. A number of highly skilled intellectuals, well grounded in the tools of modern social science research, have begun to publish books and articles analyzing their societies in depth, specifying the domestic and external mechanisms of exploitation and interpreting their meaning for Latin American development. In the universities one finds a new type of revolutionary militant in the student body—a person deeply committed to action and willing to move freely out among the people and at the same time increasingly concerned with achieving a better understanding of the social forces moving his society. On my visit to Peru, during discussions lasting well into the evening, I found that the great concern of student activists was to combine a scientific study of society with revolutionary politics. They posed the problem of understanding the political possibilities inherent in massive rural migrations to cities without industrial employment; they discussed the political opportunities among the new generation of slum dwellers who were born and raised in the *barriadas* and who do not accept the marginal changes accompanying movement from a rural to an urban milieu; they outlined plans to study the interrelationships among the economic elites, the interlocking directorates among the different sectors of society, and the consequences of elite integration in terms of

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possible political strategies and coalitions.

Many widely circulated notions, liberal and radical, concerning revolutionary action have been shunted aside by events in Latin America. In Uruguay, the Sweden of Latin America as it has been called, hundreds of trade unionists are in jail; the President rules through decree; several successful general strikes have occurred in the last several months; and the crisis sees no early end. In Argentina it is the provincial cities of Santa Fé, Rosario, and Tucumán, which have taken the lead in the struggle against the military dictator Onganía, not the capital city of Buenos Aires. In Brazil while the pro-Russian Communists talk of legal alternatives to the dictatorship of Costa e Silva, the left Catholics in *Ação Popular* (AP), together with left-wing Brazilian nationalists, organize for armed struggle. In Mexico it was the previously career-oriented secondary and vocational students who took the lead in occuping a substantial sector of downtown Mexico City and led the bloody battles against the police and army, not the students from the National University. In Chile the major conflicts today are between the unionized white-collar workers and reformist Christian Democrats, not between the oligarchy and the peasants, though peasant discontent is a bomb which may yet be detonated.

The short-run perspective in Latin America seems for the local conflicts to remain local—that is, to lack an organized party linking them to national struggles for power. But today's economic struggles, such as general strikes over wages and salaries, become increasingly political and tend to turn into confrontation with government. The immediate demands of the urban slums for *pan, techo, y trabajo* (bread, roof, and work) may be more than the paternalistic Right can deliver. And even these demands are insufficient for the new generation. The necessary link between the city and the country may be forged by the newly emerging mass of university graduates as they leave the capital for underpaid jobs in the provinces. The next decade will be decisive for the new revolutionary Left in Latin America.

An important link between the traditional Left and the new revolutionary Left now emerging is provided by the revolution-

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aries who entered politics at the time of the victory of the Cuban revolution. Interviews which I had with three imprisoned *fidelista* leaders of the Peruvian Left (Hector Bejar, Ricardo Gadea, and Hugo Blanco) provide an idea of the issues and perspectives which the new revolutionary Left is considering. The picture of the guerrilla as a romantically emotional individual, something between a *pistolero* and a politician, is false and usually is the result of ignorance based on lack of contact with the individuals involved. While one may agree or disagree with the particular revolutionary strategies adopted, it is a mistake to view the new revolutionaries as mindless activists. The leaders have made and continue to make serious efforts not only to study and assimilate the tactical lessons of their past experiences but to deepen their understanding of the broader developments of their societies. They read, depending on what their situation or the prison officials allow, not only traditional radical texts but studies by the United Nations, Ph.D. dissertations, and well researched studies by conservatives and liberal writers. Their rejection of a dogmatic approach to revolution is best seen by the description by one guerrilla leader of Debray's book as "not a model to be slavishly followed but an attempt to develop ideas more precisely in order to further the guerrilla struggle."

Having withstood torture and threats to their lives, facing long prison terms, these three Peruvian revolutionaries, Hugo Blanco, Ricardo Gadea, and Hector Bejar, have firmly maintained their revolutionary commitments. Perhaps more than anything else they serve as moral examples for the new generation of revolutionaries now coming of age. Where political corruption is rampant; where there is constant commerce between politicians who mouth all sorts of revolutionary rhetoric, and economic elites; and where opportunities for lucrative sinecures are always available for ambitious young leftists, here the revolutionaries in captivity stand as living witnesses for the "other way," the way of Che and Fidel. "Tierra o muerte!" Hugo Blanco shouted at me as we ended the interview and I left the rock of El Frontón prison.

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

ILLUMINATION, SHAME, AND SCANDAL

BY MAXWELL GEISMAR

The Trial of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn by the American Civil Liberties Union, edited and with an introduction by Corliss Lamont. Horizon Press, 1968; $5.95.

In future history books written by Asian and African scribes, it may be recorded that the period of the 1960's in the Free White World was marked by a brief resurgence of the old-fashioned American spirit in a general epoch of censorship, conformity, and repression. During this unique and short-lived period, there flourished a considerable body of Cold War revisionist historians, from the first generation of D. F. Fleming, Frederick Schuman, and William Appleman Williams to such brilliant young critics as David Horowitz and Gar Alperovitz, and many others now on our horizon.

But, alas, their work was never taken seriously by the majority of cultivated and prosperous Americans who lived out a spiritual existence still dominated by the horrendous Cold War myths of the 1950's and 1960's. To them the Rosenbergs were forever guilty and Alger Hiss remained the classic example of *their* betrayal. I doubt that even such a book as Corliss Lamont's *The Trial of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn,* which also includes the transcript of the "extraordinary meeting" of the Board of Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union—a transcript which has been expunged from the official records of the ACLU—will have the impact it should have on the national consciousness. But that should not diminish your own interest in reading this book which gets at the core of our moral dissolution during the Cold War period.

Maxwell Geismar is the distinguished historian and critic.

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Fortunately for history, Corliss Lamont kept his own transcript of the Flynn "trial" by the ACLU Board. One of the interesting things is that the Board itself could never decide whether it was a trial, a hearing, a friendly or hostile discussion, or a gathering of curious soul-mates some of whom were out to get the others. But whatever this transcript is supposed to be, it remains an historical document full of illumination, shame, and scandal. In his introduction, Mr. Lamont points out that some of the outstanding leaders of the ACLU who were especially active in removing Miss Flynn included John Haynes Holmes of New York's Community Church; Norman Thomas, the veteran Socialist leader and grand old man of the American Left; and Morris Ernst who successfully maintained his double life of being co-counsel of the ACLU and personal attorney of J. Edgar Hoover. It was this celebrated liberal, Ernst, who led the group of "purgers" against Miss Flynn, and who, in his customary fashion still insisted upon calling her Elizabeth during the trial.

Behind this group of distinguished community leaders, who were covering their moral cowardice with such a show of virtue, alarm, and indignation, were of course the historical forces which induced their hypocrisy. Under the duress of the Nazi-Soviet pact in the early years of the Second World War public opinion in the United States was inflamed against the leading civil liberties organization which, just a year before, in 1939, had proclaimed its intention of defending Communists among other victims of social injustice. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, a founding member of the American Civil Liberties Union, and twice elected to its Board, was a proclaimed, a most fiery, eloquent, and outstanding Communist. But in 1940 came the famous "Purge Resolution" which proclaimed that ACLU would not accept either Communists or Fascists in its official ranks—not that many Fascists had ever joined this organization, which indeed had, from its very inception, as Miss Flynn took pleasure in stating, included members of the IWW, revolutionary socialists, anarchists, and atheists in its leadership.

The 1940 Purge Resolution reversed the whole history of the ACLU and destroyed the struggle for American civil liberties at the very core of its existence. Meanwhile the indefatigable Morris Ernst (along with ACLU's co-counsel Arthur Garfield Hays) was making a private deal with Congressman Martin Dies that if the recently established House Committee on Un-American Activities would only leave them alone, they would clean house themselves.

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This was the classic American example of Instant Censorship on the Do-It-Yourself Plan. (In recent years I remember a very similar deal between Norman Cousins and his close friend, Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut—that ardent patriot—with respect to SANE, which in my own view has never recovered from its self-inflicted wounds.)

Has the American Civil Liberties Union similarly destroyed itself as a moral force in the history of American civil rights? (I am not discussing the various local branch chapters which have to a certain degree followed their own consciences and have done good work; the historical question is larger than that.) It is ironical that Mr. Lamont's book is published just after the ACLU made an attempt, in 1967-1968, to revise and repudiate the Purge Resolutions of an earlier period—an attempt, however, that ended up with a compromise, which, as Roger Baldwin told Corliss Lamont, was no compromise. "It's the same thing, but better expressed." The Old Guard triumphant has never paused to consider the cost of the triumph. Sanctimonious hypocrisy on their part has led to complete self-delusion; they do not even realize how they have betrayed their cultural heritage. Meanwhile, in *The Trial of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn,* we come directly to the illuminating and mysterious Transcript of their secret behavior, which is in itself such a drama, and a reflection in miniature of similar convulsions in the national psyche during the Cold War trauma.

I regret I can only give you a taste of this. Dr. John Haynes Holmes was the Board's chairman and, throwing all legal precedent aside according to his own whim, was also Chief Inquisitor presiding at Miss Flynn's pre-arranged demise. He is, to put it bluntly, horrible. But hardly less disgusting was the dramatist Elmer Rice, much to my own surprise, who surrounded his own vicious anti-Communism with lofty moral scruples. There is nothing in the world worse, as our own period has proved, than a liberal or formerly radical artist "atoning" for his guilt. (John Dos Passos has shown this; Arthur Miller promises to; and it is sad now to see that the James Wechsler of that period, as assistant editor of *The Nation,* was among those defending Miss Flynn.) But Elmer Rice is voluble at this trial, and arrogant; while Morris Ernst, having developed the whole frame-up, is friendly—even palsy-walsy. Alas for the idols of our youth in all these cases; meanwhile Norman Thomas was hardly less than vicious in his denunciations of the "Communist-dominated" American Civil Liberties Board.

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The spirit of Dr. Harry F. Ward—to whom the book is dedicated—presides over the death-throes of the American Civil Liberties Union in 1940: an organization which, as he said when resigning, was not the same organization he had dedicated so much of his life to. The spirit of Roger Baldwin, though he no longer was a member of the Board, presided over, not really the legal lynching of Miss Flynn so much as the dissolution of a truly libertarian culture. There were heroes too on this Board (the final vote was a tie until Dr. Holmes broke it), and there are some oddly comic minor figures performing as small spirits always perform in moments of crisis.

To this central drama of the hidden transcript in *The Trial of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn,* Mr. Lamont has added the crucial historical documents of the trial and the period—documents alike of suppression and dissent. This book is an invaluable record, as I say, yet the end-effect is also rather curiously quaint—as though recalling some pleasanter and *nicer* period of social repression than we have faced since, or may have to face. This was only a *beginning,* this abdication of responsibility by the presiding Board of the American Civil Liberties Union in the face of a national hysteria. What was tragic then, and seems slightly comic today, might just end up as farce.

It is by the goodness of God that in our country we have those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of them.

—*Mark Twain*

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THE MODERN WEST INDIES

BY JAY MANDLE

The Growth of the Modern West Indies by Gordon K. Lewis. Monthly Review Press, 1968; $12.50.

This very expensive book stands alone as the single most important study of the modern ex-British West Indies. It is safe to say that all future studies of the region, comprising the independent nations of Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, Tobago, and Guyana, the "associated states" of the Leeward and Windward islands, plus the Bahamas and Bermuda, will have to start with the Lewis volume. As in his previous work on Puerto Rico, Lewis combines a Marxian analytic framework with a wide reading of the literature of the area to present an extremely valuable synthesis. He is not right on all the issues he covers; especially he is too kind to non-socialist nationalists in the area, and surprisingly tough on socialists like Cheddi Jagan in Guyana. Yet, for its wide-ranging scope and cogency of analysis, this is a remarkable achievement.

The book is divided in three parts. The first third is an introduction and historical background of the region. About half of the volume offers an analysis of each of the individual islands. Here the great merit lies in the fact that Jamaica and Trinidad, the largest of the islands, do not monopolize Lewis' attention. He deals intensively not only with the Leewards and Windwards but devotes an entire chapter to the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos, the Caymans, and the Virgin Islands. This refocusing of attention away from Jamaica to the rest of the area—particularly the Eastern Caribbean—is a healthy correction to studies which tend to flow from the Jamaica particular to the West Indian general. Included also is a special chapter on the Bahamas and Bermuda, but the impression gained here is that a lack of written material, combined, perhaps, with a lack of thoroughgoing first-hand acquaintance, leaves the discussion at a superficial level.

The remainder deals with the abortive West Indian Federation, and the fragmentation of the region as each island pursued inde-

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pendence on its own. In many ways the middle chapters dealing intensively with individual islands provide the data for the generalizations contained in the later chapters on federation and independence. The most important of these generalizations is that there is a common West Indian nationhood, and this Lewis makes clear by studying each island both individually and as part of the total West Indian region.

What has happened to the West Indies is briefly this: Throughout the nineteenth century the region was considered the backwater of the British Empire. Long gone were the days of enormous profit in the sugar industry. The growth of foreign competition, adoption of free trade by the British, and the flow of West Indian labor off the estates—wherever it was physically possible—all tended to lower the profitability of the industry. Sugar, however, remained dominant in the area, which was owned largely by British investors by and large content to depend on cheap and abundant labor in the production process. Where emigration from the estates was especially pronounced, as in Trinidad and Guyana, schemes of indentured immigration were introduced in order to oversupply the domestic labor market and maintain artificially low wages. Expatriate ownership of sugar, plus a continuation of foreign and domestic mercantile and commercial interests, dominated the region. This led to a social stratification system in which there was a high correlation between race and social status.

Amazingly little happened to alter this system until the mid-1930's when a series of mass riots and semi-insurrections resulted in the first examination of the region's problems, especially its grinding poverty. The reaction was two-fold: on the part of the Mother Country, not surprisingly, an investigating Royal Commission, the Moyne Commission, was established: domestically, however, a local and regional trade union movement and a nationalist political movement were born. On one hand, the serious effort to analyze the problems of the area made by the Moyne commissioners resulted in a document too volatile to be permitted to be published until eight years after its writing. On the other hand, the trade unions and political parties provided the first opportunity for large numbers among the West Indian population to participate in mass movements to achieve social change. The creation of channels for mass participation in politics since 1938 has largely been responsible for the changes, especially independence, that have come to the area. But the limitation and failures of this movement have at the same

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time kept the West Indies very much the way they were in the 1930's. In particular, the same domination of sugar and commercial interests persists, only now joined by Canadian and American light manufacturing and tourist investors. Large-scale poverty in rural shacks and urban slums persists, and the real freedom to shape a distinct West Indian culture and identity is clearly being eroded by the corrosive introduction of American values.

The various West Indian movements, whether led by intellectual-scholar types like Eric Williams in Trinidad, rural demagogues like Alexander Bustamante in Jamaica, or self-acknowledged Marxists like Cheddi Jagan, have all floundered. The true mark of their failure was signaled by the bickering and quarrelling associated with the birth and demise of the West Indian Federation. Lewis places much responsibility for the failure of federation on the British—as it should be—but it must be conceded that the West Indian nationalists themselves were unable to advance beyond British tutelage and create a viable West Indian nation.

Lewis takes the nationalist movement to task for its pro-British outlook adopted after World War II. The historical reason why this outlook and consequent policies persist is not explicitly analyzed, however. Clearly, as Lewis emphasizes, the pro-Western political direction taken by the movement throughout the region, with the possible exception of the People's Progressive Party in Guyana, was a disaster for the area. I would suggest that the historical roots of this approach may be found in two sources: the class composition of the leadership of the movement, and the growing desire of the British through the 1950's to vacate the region.

It was the indigenous middle class which provided the leadership for the first political mass movements in the area. Affronted by racial and national oppression, lawyers, teachers, and professionals in general championed the cause of West Indian nationhood. The rhetoric of the movement was loud and militant, and the early urge on the part of the British to maintain their Empire provided an excellent target for their wrath. The very composition of the leadership, however, insured that radical programs, as opposed to militant nationalist ones, would not be offered. Independence was desired—even demanded—but liberation from plantation domination at home and from foreign investment control abroad were never an integral part of the independence drive.

The middle class, politically more radical than the long dominant plantocracy, but nonetheless believing in property as the

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organizing basis of society, was able to maintain its leadership over the movement because it was able to demonstrate some political success. Interestingly, they were assisted by their antagonists, the British. For as the need for success mounted under popular pressure, so too did the British desire to leave the area under the stress of Britain's own fiscal problems. By the 1950's there was enough motion towards federation on one hand, and independence on the other to maintain the legitimacy of the established West Indian political leadership. The ability to make political progress, however, meant that the class composition of the leadership and program of the movement never were confronted. Consequently, until the present day, the rhetoric of militancy continues, but the substance of radicalism is absent. The middle class has brought the West Indies to political independence, but is unable to move beyond that to real social, cultural, and economic liberation.

Only Cheddi Jagan and the PPP in Guyana represent a major departure from the scheme outlined above. Jagan in the early 1950's was brilliantly successful in putting together Guyana's first interracial (East Indian and African) political movement. The PPP was under Marxist leadership, though it was not explicitly a Marxist party, and for that reason generated a very different response from the British than had other political movements in the region. The British deposed Jagan and the PPP from office in 1953, three months after the party had swept into office in the colony's first universal suffrage election. Under the strain of British intervention, the new interracial alliance broke apart. Forbes Burnham moved out to lead the African population, while Jagan was left as the head of the now largely East Indian PPP.

The PPP again was successful in elections in 1957 and 1961. Because of this, independence was delayed until a proportional representation system could be devised to take advantage of the fact that Jagan had received only a plurality of the votes. Under the new system the PPP again received more votes than any other party, but this time it was possible for an anti-Jagan alliance led by Burnham to come to power. Independence, then, could be "safely" bestowed. Jagan's last years in office, 1962-1964, had been marked by virtual rebellion of the country's black urban population—under the stimulus of the CIA and their domestic counterparts—and Jagan himself had to call upon the British to help police the country.

The ability of the British first to remove the PPP from office, and then to generate the racial division which ultimately led to the

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present Burnham-led government must again be traced to the weakness of the Guyanese nationalist movement. Much has been said about the crude Marxism which characterized Jagan's speeches and analysis. But in Guyana something much more important was at work to facilitate the break-up of Jagan's political united front than vulgar Marxism. That was the consequence of racial and demographic separation that had divided the races in the colony throughout its history.

Faced with the evacuation of the black sugar workers from the estates with the ending of slavery in 1838, the Guyanese sugar plantocracy either had to find a comparably cheap source of labor, or face ruin at the hands of slave-using competitors. Their solution was the importation of indentured workers from India—laborers legally confined to work on the estates for the duration of their period of indenture, usually five years. While the sugar owners received government financial assistance in their effort to supply the local labor market, as many barriers as possible were placed in the way of the Indians moving off the estates, as the blacks had done early in the nineteenth century. Return to India was expensive, dangerous, and generally discouraged, but land within the colony was not provided; nor, when settlement did occur, did the government provide assistance.

The rate at which Indian labor came to British Guyana varied according to the needs of the industry. By the end of the twentieth century, with severe competition again being confronted—this time from European beet production—the flow had been reduced. However, the thirst of the producers for cheap labor was unquenchable, and even in periods of deep depression the flow continued. Ultimately the migration of laborers was cut off at the source of supply in India, in 1916, by which time over 350,000 East Indians had been imported into a country whose total population had never been more than 250,000 to 300,000.

Well into the twentieth century the East Indians and Africans were separated occupationally and geographically. As late as World War II only a very small percentage of the East Indians were urban dwellers, while probably half of the rest of the population lived in the urban areas. At the time the PPP was founded, it was considered a remarkable achievement to organize a movement comprising groups differing so radically in status, culture, and residence. The ease with which the British were able to break apart the alli-

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ance, however, is suggestive of the fragility of the unity which masked such deep divisions in the country.

Paradoxically, it was the first significant breakdown in the ethnic division of the society, and consequently the first step toward the national integration necessary for the development of a truly radical movement that was responsible for Jagan's troubles in 1962-1964. Through the entire post-war period rapid internal migration by the East Indians from rural areas especially to Georgetown, the capital city, occurred. The pattern of a rapid rate of rural population growth, combined with a decline in employment opportunities in sugar, forced thousands of East Indians to migrate to the cities. There, really for the first time since the early days of indenture, direct economic competition between the two groups occurred. This competition in the context of high and growing rates of unemployment, together with cultural and social differences, produced a set of group conflicts of truly horrifying proportions.

Through all of this Jagan continues to plug away, sometimes emphasizing a national, sometimes an explicitly Marxist-socialist approach, by means of the PPP. Even here, however, questions have been raised about the basic political interests of Jagan's East Indian constituents—especially urban East Indian merchants, who reportedly contribute to the PPP, and the East Indian peasant rice farmers, who are an important base to the party. One wonders whether Jagan is their leader because he is a Marxist or because he is an East Indian. It is conceivable that the merchants and farmers are betting that even if he came to office, he would not be able to implement a program which would effect their economic interests, but would promote their cultural and social interests as East Indians.

In the rest of the West Indies the problem is that the outlook and approach of the popular nationalistic movements are too narrow to undertake the social reconstruction for which the region desperately cries out. In Guyana there is a movement which proclaims a desire to undertake the task of social change, but it appears that the process of ethnic integration has not proceeded sufficiently to establish conditions to make such a program feasible. Lewis seems to be especially pessimistic about Guyana, and for many of the reasons cited above. My own feeling is that the patient spadework in political education which Jagan has done and continues to do may reap benefits in the future, when the process of social integration has moved further along. At such time as there is a

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decent level of social intercourse between the East Indian and African political leadership—probably not Jagan, who will be too closely associated with the conflicts of the past—it may be possible to take advantage of the political sophistication of many Guyanese, which will be Jagan's legacy.

One does not come away from the Lewis book feeling that the West Indies is a region ripe for revolution. Instead, one learns over again that economic deprivation and exploitation alone do not produce radicalism. Here a combination of the late emergence of nationalistic politics, the cheap victory of the dominant middle class over the British, and the special ethnic problems in Guyana and (to a lesser extent) in Trinidad and Tobago has resulted in an abortive approach to social problems. The radical intellectuals of the area like to talk about a new round of social change about to begin, and it may be that in fact new political movements are about to be created. But even if that is true, it is clear that major problems in the area have yet to be tackled. Lewis gives a brilliant analysis of the problems that have impeded progress in the past. The hope for the future is that the "new round" will be more successful in overcoming these difficulties.

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CORRESPONDENCE

ON YOUTH AND REVOLUTION

The capitalist system is approaching a profound crisis. The war in Vietnam, the internal disintegration in the United States, and the run on gold are but its preliminary manifestations.

In the socialist world as well, the period of postwar stability is drawing to a close, as the internal contradictions begin to surface.

And the youth, those who have an idealistic—in the proper sense of the term—stake in the future, who express an unselfish, for-the-good-of-their-fellow-men philosophy, are taking the initiative in challenging the bureaucratic establishments in both capitalist and socialist societies.

One would expect that at certain times and places there would be a stirring of the youth. But how to explain the present world-wide revolt? Even granted that a student revolt at Berkeley can spark another at Columbia or even in Paris, Berlin, or Mexico City, the enormous spread of the student movement today cannot be accounted for by contagion.

The period of relative stability of the capitalist system since the Second World War is coming to an end. Within six months, the pound, the dollar, and the franc, the three major currencies, came under severe bombardment. And while the international bankers may be able to plaster over a cracked façade, and in the form of Special Drawing Rights conjure up *ersatz* gold and patch the monetary system, they cannot restructure the machine, but only tinker with its weak and outmoded parts. There is no rule that says an economic crisis must conform to the classic pattern of a crash followed by a depression. Certainly neither the present economic crisis in Great Britain nor the threatened one in France bears any resemblance to earlier models. Economic trouble in the United States is quite likely to resemble that already visible in Britain.

The war in Vietnam highlights all the problems in such sharp focus that the patch-and-paste proposals are exposed for what they are. No wonder the students and the black militants have taken

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their first necessary step toward revolution, the recognition that the ruling class can no longer rule, i.e., can no longer solve the problems of the society.

Berkeley was the testing ground for the militant students. Here were worked out the tactics for securing allies and, with these allies, for raising issues which would mobilize large numbers of students.

The most successful application of the lessons learned in the Berkeley struggles was at Columbia. These two issues rallied the students and brought them face to face with the establishment: the encroachment of the university upon the surrounding black community, symbolized in the construction of the gymnasium in Morningside Park, and the involvement of the university in the war, through its participation in the Institute of Defense Analysis.

The main reason the radical students were so successful in enlisting the support of their fellow students is that, with the enormous postwar expansion, the administrations have become impersonal, blatantly authoritarian, and almost wholly divorced from the goals and aspirations of the student bodies. It is therefore relatively easy for the students to project their present educational experience and conflicts with authority into society in general. They see themselves being prepared, as the commencement speakers remind them *ad nauseam,* for the role of "leaders" in a society they have just begun to reject. If they conform, if they serve an apprenticeship for a certain number of years, then they can qualify for decision-making jobs in support of the status quo, in the perpetuation of an affluent ad-mass order, while they are comfortably housed in sterile, split-level, air-conditioned suburbia.

So the youth have written new scenes into the political script. Not only do they reject the bourgeois parties in an attempt to radicalize their fellows; they reject the established radical parties that have grown content to work within the bourgeois framework. To the students, the older radical parties have forfeited their right to consideration because they have, in effect, given up the struggle for socialism by refusing to acknowledge that "the duty of a revolutionary is to make revolution," with the corollary that, in a nonrevolutionary situation, as in the United States at the present time, their duty is to prepare for the revolution.

In France the situation was entirely different. Once the radical cliques had submerged their futile ideological differences and

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united on a common action program, the students were moved to confront not only the academic authorities but the regime itself. Almost overnight the challenge was taken up by the workers and a considerable section of the peasantry. Ten million strong, the workers rejected the bread-and-butter concessions which the leaders of the radical parties had obtained from the capitalists, and raised the cry of an end to the Fifth Republic. The left party leaders, now thoroughly alarmed, urged the workers to accept the concessions, evacuate the factories, and rely on the upcoming bourgeois elections—in which, of course, de Gaulle scored an overwhelming victory.

The French experience teaches two lessons: first, the advanced capitalist countries are not immune to revolutionary or pre-revolutionary situations; and second, a spontaneous movement, while it can spark a revolution, cannot carry it through. For the carry-through an organized leadership is necessary. The French radical parties, far from leading the struggle, tailed behind the workers and tried to smother the revolt, fearing that de Gaulle would precipitate civil war by bringing in the troops. They evidently considered that the balance of forces was unfavorable, that the ten million workers, plus the peasantry, plus the segments of the middle class represented by the students, were insufficient to overcome an army conscripted largely from these same classes!

In the socialist world, the revolt of the youth is against the controlling bureaucracy. The struggle in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe is for a more "open society," for the establishment of certain bourgeois rights. But the building of socialism, the transformation of the material conditions of existence, creates the necessary preconditions for, but does not guarantee, the transformation of the nature of man himself. Man, being at once an individual and a social entity, reflects the drives and forces, incompatible and divisive, that correspond to his dual nature. Under capitalism, as under earlier exploitative systems, the selfish, individualistic aspect of man's nature has dominated. Centuries of such conditioning cannot be overcome without a prolonged struggle. The bureaucracy under socialism may for a time control or confine these selfish impulses, it may even harness them in the form of material or self-seeking incentives to create a socialist economy, but such expedients will never produce communism.

Mao Tse-tung seized upon the student revolt in Peking to attack both the bureaucratic controls and their concomitant ma-

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terial incentives. Simultaneously, Mao is attempting in the erection of a socialist economy to bring into dominance the social aspect of man's nature, demonstrating in the life-struggle itself that the fullest development of the individual can be achieved only through unselfish dedication to the advancement of society as a whole.

Mao's Cultural Revolution in China has encountered stiff resistance from the entrenched bureaucracy, has opened up opportunities for disruption by class enemies, and has led to aberrations and distortions by the Red Guard themselves. The capitalists look with glee upon the confusion that the revolution of the youth is producing in China, at the same time that they fear the healthy enthusiasm it has evoked. *Pravda*, on the other hand, views with alarm the possibility that the Chinese Communist Party as a controlling bureaucracy will be destroyed. Indeed, it is being destroyed, and it is being replaced by a tripartite alliance of the new revolutionary forces, the Red Army cadres, and that section of the bureaucracy which can be converted to the transformation of society by the new "permanent revolution."

My conclusions are these: (1) that the post-World War period of stabilization and consolidation in both the capitalist and socialist worlds is drawing to a close; (2) that the conflicts and contradictions which were developing and maturing in both worlds are now surfacing; and (3) that the global revolt of the youth is both a heralding of coming revolutionary struggles and a precipitating element in these very struggles themselves.

John H. Reynolds

St. Augustine, Florida
September 1968

A child born today in the United Kingdom stands a ten times greater chance of being admitted to a mental hospital than to a university, and about one fifth of mental hospital admissions are diagnosed schizophrenic. This can be taken as an indication that we are driving our children mad more effectively than we are genuinely educating them. Perhaps it is our way of educating them that is driving them mad.

—*R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience*

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NO REVOLUTIONARY LEGITIMACY

It is a healthy development that you insist that there is no such thing as revolutionary legitimacy (MR, July-August 1968, p. 5). "Legitimacy" is conferred subjective authority. Revolutionary success follows objectively after a thorough defeat of the enemy. It is functional in its essence. What has gone wrong is that a structural "legitimacy" has developed within the revolution. Institutions developed initially to win have become valued ends in themselves—an "establishment within the establishment" so to speak. The "legitimate" Marxist institutions exist, coexist, sterilely alongside the imperialist institutions and within the imperialist establishment. Respectability and legality steer potential rebels away from rebellion.

It is a travesty on scientific socialism for any clique to claim that it has been handed the celestial tablets of legitimacy in the Mosaic fashion. As in the making of the revolution, so in the consolidation of the revolution. He who succeeds in this task is a successful revolutionary; he who fails, unsuccessful; he who doesn't try—despite his clique pedigree—is no revolutionary at all. There is no legitimacy in this field either, no *a priori* mandate for exclusive authority, and nobody is objectively excluded from the right, and indeed the duty, to try.

This is what the events in Czechoslovakia, in Cuba, and in China are all about. Some who are outside the "legitimate" line of Stalinist party descent believe that they have the right, duty, and natural privilege to try to consolidate the revolution and build socialism and communism in their countries based on an intimate knowledge of local conditions and obstacles. The Novotny group in Czechoslovakia, the Muscovites in China and Cuba and elsewhere, being in the "legitimate" line of Stalinist party descent, believe that their pedigrees give them exclusive rights to attempt to consolidate the revolution and build socialism and communism—and they believe that this includes and is sanctified by a mandate to spew out a carbon copy of the Russian experience that is historically based on the peculiarities of local Russian conditions.

The results have been, on the one hand, to frustrate the efforts

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of local functional communists in many socialist states to gain enthusiastic popular support by building socialism and communism on the existing social base; and, on the other hand, to force a small group of privileged leaders to resort to police repression and suppression of communications to "make" and "save" the revolution.

Enthusiastic popular support is absolutely essential for consolidating the revolution, catching up with the imperialist metropolis economically, aiding other nations effectively and victoriously in their struggle to win national liberation and socialism, and in building socialism and communism at home. Native Chinese leaders in spirit rally to that task, while Muscovites in spirit in China endanger the Chinese Revolution by trying to hold the Chinese people in check, according to the historic formula of the milder revolutionary experience of the Westernized Russian people, more restrained by far because of the cultural specifics of its content, more individualist and bourgeois as it is.

The Cubans, being half Western and half African, and being a small nation on the doorstep of the Colossus of the North, very much used to being stepped on, respond with a brave attempt to build socialism and communism rapidly at home, and to help other nations, especially in Latin America, to win their freedom. But Cuba responds without the strength and solidity of the massive Chinese nation.

The revolution flourishes when it responds to its objective circumstances; it withers when it attempts to copy the pattern conditioned by the Russian circumstances. The revolution wins enthusiastic popular support by responding positively to its particular objective circumstances.

The Czechs and most other Eastern Europeans, being highly Westernized, are also highly subject to the Western historic culture of liberalism with its concomitant elements of personal cynicism, exaggerated selfishness, and extreme bias against a programmatic and theoretical outlook on human problems and world affairs—this bias, called "pragmatism," being against man's systematically solving his problems. Flexibility, spontaneity, inventiveness, boldness, ingenuity, self-respect, individuality, drive, etc., are good traits for building socialism and communism. Personal cynicism, exaggerated and irresponsible and often malicious selfishness of Western liberal culture are not good traits. But attempting to negate this negative tendency by rule of fear just drives the Eastern European people deeper into cultural and eventually political reaction. It is the

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agent of fear that is negated. The people must fear reaction, and not the "agent," or would-be agent, of the revolution.

First, the new Eastern European Communist leaders who are native in spirit realize that confidence must be built amongst the people by respecting their historic cultural level in practice. Once enthusiastic popular support is thus attained, then and only then will the Eastern European people be ready to move forward to the higher cultural level of revolution. People, not police, move toward socialism. Each people may do so only voluntarily, which means starting from its existing cultural level, more or less free of individualistic bias. The Chinese Cultural Revolution depends on motivated masses of people, not on mock trials or secret police violence. It is natural, as their culture is freer of individualism, that the Chinese lead. The Eastern Europeans and the Russians can follow best by starting at their own cultural levels, admitting them, and not using police measures. It must be pointed out that any attempt to force the Muscovite establishment in Russia itself, if anybody had the power to do it, toward a higher or Chinese cultural level of revolution would be doomed to failure and would end only in frustration and harm, for the basic reasons that are universally germane to these other cultures, all of them. Revolution cannot be exported to Russia any more than it can be dosed out from an outside source to any other country. The Chinese model cannot be *arbitrarily* imposed on Russia in the name of legitimacy, even if the Chinese model is a more progressive model than the Russian one. More progressive elements must develop *within the Russian situation itself*. Polemicizing is a subjective activity, and, while polemics agitate and educate those who are beginning to move, propelled by objective forces within their own society, polemics alone cannot account for movement. This is the *force majeure* of which MONTHLY REVIEW speaks, and it is *not* a call for the overthrow of Soviet society out of whose womb it must come.

Russia, having a culture and historic background very much like that of Eastern Europe, will probably follow on the Eastern European road to the higher cultural level of revolution. It is no coincidence that the pedigreed "legitimate revolutionaries" of Muscovia compare the vital local Reds of Czechoslovakia to Mao.

"Red Guards" will appear all over the world, but they will multiply and triumph only in circumstances which have developed objectively favorable to their growth. A Marxist movement fully

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under the control of the local people of the country is this red condition. For the growth and health of the revolution, let Muscovia acknowledge this, honestly adapt itself to this, and forget transcendental "legitimacy."

Bernard Edwin Galitz

Somerville, Massachusetts
July 14, 1968

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Mass Marketing

This week Uncle Sam brought me a letter from an MR reader. The letter raises two questions: What makes the U.S. economy tick? Has it been stabilized?

There are three driving forces behind the U.S. economy. The first and in many ways the most important, is the revolution in science, technology, and administration which has been going full-steam ahead for about a century. This revolution on the production side has substituted machines and automation for hand tools and single processes. On the consumer side it has turned out a great quantity and variety of goods and services, taught consumers to want new, dated products, and supplied them through a mass-marketing apparatus at prices within the income range of the average consumer.

Second, this revolutionary change has created a unified, continent-wide mass market large enough and sufficiently consolidated to support nationwide advertising in mass media: billboards, press, radio, television—which reach most families in the country every day or even every hour on the hour. The new means of communication provide producers with a consuming public of two hundred millions who listen and watch for the latest, the cheapest, and the best bargains.

Mass supplies of goods and services provide enterprising businessmen with the profits they seek, only if consumers are able to buy them with cash or credit. The U.S. economy provides its consuming public with the cash and credit necessary to buy the bulk of the mass-produced goods and services.

Other economies, the British for example, depend heavily on foreign territories and foreign sources for food, raw material markets, and markets for manufacturers and for investment capital. The U.S. economy, until quite recently, has relied chiefly on its own mass sources of food and raw material and its own continent-wide mass market.

This time last year I spent four months in India, a sub-

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continent with about 500 million inhabitants. Half a billion people should be a wonderful mass market, provided Indians had the wherewithal to buy. There is the rub. The going wage for unskilled work in India is from 2 to 4 rupees a day—less in the countryside, more in the cities. A rupee exchanges for 14 U.S. cents.

On this wage a family of four or five can buy either a fairly adequate diet or modestly decent living quarters. The wage will not buy both, and leaves little or nothing for the other necessities and niceties of life. There are two and a half times as many people in India as there are in the United States, but the Indian market is made up largely of people who consider themselves fortunate to have the bare necessities of existence. The purchasing power of most Indians is sharply limited by the 28 cent to 56 cent daily wage.

I said to Indian manufacturers and merchants I met: "You are trying to sell bicycles, radio sets, or typewriters. The starvation wages you are paying will not allow workers to buy your wares and therefore limit your market to the middle class and the rich. Instead of two rupees a day, pay twenty; at such wages you will expand your market and sell more goods."

In theory they agreed that a human being becomes a customer only when he has cash or credit in his pocket. In practice, they said, it would never work in India as it has worked elsewhere. So they go on paying starvation wages and the Indian sub-continental mass market remains only a dream.

U.S. policy makers, for the last half century, have taken the hint and provided the masses with purchasing power. There is a legal minimum wage of ten or twelve dollars per day. In 1968 the total of wages and salaries paid was about $450 billion. Personal savings were around $40 billion for the year. This left more than $400 billion per year in the hands of consumers. (The actual figure for "personal consumption expenditures" reported by the Federal Reserve Board for the third quarter of 1968 was at an annual rate of $541 billion per year or an average per person of over $2,600. In addition to wages and salaries consumers spend income received as rent, interest, dividends.)

These billions are spent each year by U.S. consumers for

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the necessities of life. They also buy comforts, conveniences, and luxuries of every sort. So long as these sums are put in the hands of consumers the Gross National Production in the United States ($870 billion per year in the third quarter of 1968) can be largely absorbed by the home market for producer and consumer goods.

The U.S. economy is far from self-sufficient, and inflation is distorting it seriously at the moment. But it is immense in volume, and it is built upon consumers who have been taught that spending is the chief economic virtue.

It goes without saying that the U.S. mass market is duplicated more or less in all of the modernized countries of the world. Indeed, the mass market is one of the chief economic features of economic maturity.

Masters of the U.S. economy are not resting on their oars. On the contrary, they are steadily increasing the volume of mass advertising, reaching more consumers with appeals to buy unnecessary products and services, thus extending the market. At the same time, through publicly and privately supported research, they are inventing and discovering new gadgets and gimmicks that will pull more dollars out of consumers' purses.

Mass production for a mass market has given a new lease on life to a profit economy that was suffering from "overproduction" when the going wage rate for unskilled labor was a dollar for nine hours.

Economic Stability

Large volume in production and marketing is no guarantee of economic stability. The Great Depression which began in 1928 proved that. The most modernized countries were among the hardest hit.

Competition in a free market does not stabilize an economy. It leads to speculation, over-investment in certain lines, production in excess of market demand, glut, recession, stagnation.

That lesson was rubbed in also by the Great Depression. For the past forty years the United States, like other modernized economies, has turned from competition to consolidation and monopoly as a means of stabilizing the economy.

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Impressed and inspired by successes in socialist countries, business-for-profit has added two other items to its bag of tricks. The first, and perhaps the more important, is careful economic and social planning and bookkeeping. The second, government subsidy, is the revival of a very old practice.

A century ago U.S. free enterprises coined the phrase: no government in business. They wanted business enterprise to be free, with the sky the limit. The Great Depression showed the need of sufficient subsidy to keep business going and maintain the volume of profits.

The Washington government, through tariffs and subsidies, not only encourages and protects private business, but government has become the biggest customer in the United States. In the closing months of 1968 government expenditures for goods and services stood at over $190 billion per year. Of the Gross National Product government was buying almost one quarter. Around two fifths of these government expenses were for "national defense."

Following the general trend, business and government have become partners in the capitalist countries. Business is the senior partner, government the junior.

Business operates to make profits. Government is not only the biggest customer of business, but government is concentrating on two big problems which ensure profits for business. One is "national defense." The other is economic stability.

If sales lag, government steps in with plans for highways, urban renewal, conservation, more social security expenditures. Government guarantees bank accounts and keeps a watchful eye on speculation. If business is losing money, government through a Reconstruction Finance Corporation shovels money into the empty coffers of over-extended business. If inflation threatens, as it did in December 1968, government agencies raise interest rates.

Government backing for business is wonderful—for business. At the height of prosperity, in 1928, corporation profits in the United States were $10.5 billion. At the depth of depression in 1933, losses were $1.2 billion. Bailed out by government, subsidized and regulated, private business is currently reporting

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corporate profits in the second quarter of 1968 at a rate of $89 billion per year.

Regulated economy, underwritten by government, has given U.S. Big Business a level of profits extending over thirty years which has no parallel in U.S. economic history or in the history of any other modern nation.

Business-government partnership has paid off for the business interests in every country with a developed monopoly capitalism. It has brought affluence to consumers and provided politicians with generous funds for spending. But it has not brought stability. Instead, it is plagued by speculation, inflation, and the old seesaw of boom and bust.

King Size Feather Beds

Feather-bedding is playing an increasing role in the U.S. economy. As the years pass, more Americans are saying to their fellow citizens: "I am retiring. You go on working. I'll rest and enjoy life."

Anyone who has income-yielding property sufficient to pay living expenses has a snug feather bed. Income-yielding property may be land or real estate which pays rent; bonds, notes, and mortgages which pay interest; stocks which pay dividends; or a sinecure which pays a salary in exchange for little or no work. Income-yielding property may be bought by the owner, given from father to son, inherited. It may even be the product of black-market dealings. In any case the owner gathers in the unearned income. From infancy through maturity to old age those born into property-owning families may say to the productive workers: "You toil and produce bread; we will eat it."

Wherever and whenever the means of production have been privately owned, the owners have lived, without working, on the output of the productive workers. With the pattern of property titles and unearned income well established, the owners have been able to set themselves apart from the workers, with incomes larger than the incomes of workers, and have passed on to new generations the possibility of living in luxury while doing no work and performing no service. In short, they made up propertied classes entitled to wealth and leisure.

The U.S. economy has been building up a "you work, I

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eat" class with frightening speed. It is only a few years ago that most U.S. citizens were farmers, businessmen, commercial employees, or professionals. Most people took work for granted. Few able-bodied adults lived, without labor, on the produce of others. There have been government bonds from colonial days. The growth of corporate business led to the issue of stocks, bonds, mortgages, and notes, all bearing interest or paying dividends. As the productive wealth of the country grew, the volume of corporate securities kept pace. In the opening days of 1969 the income paid in the form of rent, interest, and dividends has reached staggering proportions.

I have on my desk the *Monthly Bulletin of the Federal Reserve Board*. One part of the *Bulletin* always contains figures for national production, national income, and the division of the national income among the owners of various kinds of property. In 1968 owners of land and real estate collected $20 billion as rent; owners of capital collected $24 billion as interest; owners of stocks received $23 billion as dividends. Two other items should be added to this list. The first is proprietary income—the profits of private business enterprises: $60 billion in 1968. The second item is the profit of corporations: $80 billion in 1968.

It is not possible to add all of these items together. They are dissimilar and there are duplications. But the figures suggest that with the present Gross National Production of over $800 billion, from a fifth to a quarter (from $160 billion to $200 billion) is being paid to people simply because they own income-yielding property.

If U.S. national production is cut like a pie into four or five pieces, one of these pieces—from $160 to $200 billion worth —is being turned over to people who are in a position to say to the majority of their fellow citizens: "You go on working; we will eat."

This is the king-sized feather bed that the U.S. wealth lords have been building since the corporate era got under way after 1870. Other plutocracies in other countries have been similarly employed in feather bed production, but U.S. plutocrats have outdistanced their rivals by setting up the planet's largest, softest, and plushiest feather bed.

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(*Continued from inside front cover*)

being discussed both inside and outside the shop, and it may be some time yet before any definite decisions are made. When that time comes, there will of course be a public announcement. In the meantime, heartfelt thanks go to all of you who have written or phoned messages of condolence, concern, and encouragement. We would like to answer them all personally, but that would take many hours which could ill be spared from the work of the magazine and the press.

A letter from a reader, received before Leo's death, seems worth quoting in full:

"For years I have been trying to find out what this socialism is. I have been reading copies of MONTHLY REVIEW borrowed from a friend but it contains so many unusual words and terminology that I cannot understand it. Even looking up the words in the dictionary did no good.

"Then I happened on the December, 1967, issue of your magazine in which I found an article by Leo Huberman entitled 'How to Spread the Word.' The way he worked that out, with questions and answers, was splendid, and made it all clear. I was very sorry that the article ended so soon. I could have gone on reading for a long time and really learned something.

"Has Mr. Huberman written a book along these lines? In other words, has he finished the business he started in that magazine? If so, I certainly want a copy for myself and other copies to give to my friends. Or if he is going to write a pamphlet along those lines, I would order several copies right now.

"Thank you, Mr. Huberman, for that article."

We sent the writer *Introduction to Socialism* by MR's editors, and she wrote back, "The book you sent is interesting and answers my questions." It should be added that all of Leo's books—and especially *We, the People* and *Man's Worldly Goods,* both on MR Press's list—are written in the same clear, understandable style. There is no better way to start (or continue) a socialist education than to read and digest these classics.

Our correspondent's letter stirred other thoughts too. If she can't understand much of what she reads in MR, even with the help of a dictionary, the chances are that a large part of the fault lies with those of us who write the magazine. So we hereby make a New Year's resolution for 1969 to pay more attention, in both writing and editing, to clarity and comprehensibility. And we ask all who submit manuscripts to us, solicited and unsolicited, to do likewise. There is no place in a self-respecting socialist periodical for bad, sloppy, or pretentious writing.

An Associate in San Diego writes: "Two years ago I talked to the head lady at the history department of the San Diego Main Library about MR and its publications. They had a couple of samples on hand (located after search under shelves) but had never read MR nor heard of it. Their budget wouldn't allow a subscription, she said. Also Hinton's *Fanshen* was unheard of. This year both *Fanshen* and MR are in the library. Isn't that gratifying as an example of what one 'grandma' MR Associate can do with a little effort and courage?" It certainly is, and many thanks. We are sure that many others could do the same if they would but make the effort and have the courage.

It is with regret and sadness that we report the death of our old and loyal friend Dorothy Douglas on December 11th of a heart attack. At 78 she was still teaching economics full time at Hofstra, and her death came at the end of a long day as she was walking across the campus with her colleague (and another good friend of ours) Lynn Turgeon. Dorothy was gentle, kind, and generous, an indefatigable worker in every radical cause.

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